INTRODUCTION
Senator Church provided this powerful warning to the American people in 1975 after overseeing a congressional investigation into abuses by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other components of the intelligence community. The concerns that he expressed twenty-five years ago have resurfaced recently in connection with an American intelligence-gathering program referred to as ECHELON, which has been the subject of much controversy of late. While the full extent of the intelligence community's current capabilities is not entirely known, systems such as ECHELON are certainly far more effective than the systems that aroused such great fear in Senator Church. ECHELON is a code word that has been used to refer to the worldwide effort on the part of the United States and its allies to intercept communications intelligence (COMINT).
2 ECHELON is believed to be a joint initiative led by the National Security Agency in conjunction with its counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It is believed to intercept all forms of global communication, from telephone conversations to satellite data transmission. The various allegations surrounding ECHELON can be roughly grouped into two categories. The first set of allegations, coming primarily from Europe, concerns the use of the ECHELON system to conduct economic espionage on behalf of American companies. 3 The second set of allegations involves the illegal use of ECHELON to collect intelligence about American citizens. This second set of allegations will be the focus of this Note. In a society such as ours, which considers privacy and freedom from intrusive government to be fundamental values, 4 the prospect of the American government spying on its citizens is extremely troubling. These allegations raise questions about the sufficiency of the legal restrictions placed on the collection and use of signals intelligence. The use of national intelligence assets to conduct industrial espionage for the benefit of American companies over their foreign competitors is controversial, 5 but that issue turns primarily upon matters of policy rather than law. This Note will focus on the legal restrictions on signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities and, thus, will set aside the primarily 2. COMINT is defined by the NSA as "technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than their intended recipient" and is a major component of signals intelligence (SIGINT), which also includes the collection of noncommunication signals such as radar emissions. Duncan Campbell, Interception Capabilities 2000 (Apr. 1999) (volume two in the five-volume report "Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Political Abuse of Economic Information," a working document for the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Panel of the European Commission), http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/interception_capabilities_2000.htm (working document, on file with the Duke Law Journal). ECHELON is alleged to be primarily a COMINT program, but because the legal regime that surrounds it applies more broadly to SIGINT, these terms will both appear in this Note. 4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("They [the Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
5. Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey was quoted in 1993 as saying that economic espionage has become "in some ways the hottest current topic in intelligence policy issues." Jim Mann, Woolsey Cites Dangers in Economic Espionage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at A10.
policy-driven question of using national intelligence assets to conduct economic espionage. 6 Part I of this Note begins by surveying the origins of the ECHELON program and the various means by which COMINT is collected. It outlines how the public has become aware of ECHELON and what action has been taken in response to the various allegations leveled against the NSA. Part II of this Note provides an overview of the legal regime that has been put in place to protect innocent Americans from unconstitutional use of the powerful electronic surveillance technology possessed by the United States intelligence community. After discussing the interconnected concerns of the Fourth Amendment, federal legislation, executive orders, and agency regulations that make up this legal regime, Part III argues that this legal regime has not kept pace with recent fundamental changes in the field of communications technology and SIGINT. This part will highlight examples of how the concepts embodied in the legal regime are no longer viable given the recent evolution of communications technology. The author does not propose to provide specific revisions to the legal regime surrounding SIGINT collection, as this would be a nearly impossible task given the shortage of reliable, publicly available information. This Note instead attempts to use some specific examples to highlight what is likely a larger problem and convince the reader of the need for a thorough reevaluation of the legal regime that regulates SIGINT collection. Developing this legal regime presents the formidable task of balancing national security against individual liberties. 7 It is the responsibility of the President and our elected representatives in Congress to determine how this balance should be struck. 7. President Carter recognized this delicate balance when he stated that "one of the most difficult tasks in a free society like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to guarantee our nation's security on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on the other. 
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I. WHAT IS ECHELON?

A. Overview
The government has never specifically acknowledged the existence of a program with the code name ECHELON. The closest a representative of the United States intelligence community has come to publicly confirming the existence of ECHELON was when the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, referred to the "socalled ECHELON program of the National Security Agency" in congressional testimony on signals intelligence activities in April 2000. 8 What has been published about the ECHELON system can be attributed to whistle-blowing former employees, internal leaks, freedom of information requests, and surely a healthy amount of speculation. 9 ECHELON is alleged to be the code word for a worldwide signals intelligence collection effort that is believed to intercept all forms of global communications, including telephone, facsimile, e-mail, and data transmission. 10 People writing about and discussing this subject have used the term ECHELON very broadly, and it currently refers to almost every element of communications intelligence operations carried out by the United States and its close allies. 11 There is evidence to suggest, however, that ECHELON was a code word used to refer to a network of computers that was used to process intercepted 9. For a good description of how one goes about researching a top-secret subject, such as ECHELON, see generally Nicky Hager, Researching Echelon, TELEPOLIS, Apr. 11, 2000 (describing how New Zealand author Nicky Hager obtained classified information for his book, Secret Power, which describes New Zealand's role in the UK/USA global alliance), http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/5993/1.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
10. Tom Zeller, Cloak, Dagger, Echelon, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at A16 ("At its core, ECHELON is a network of ground stations with dishes aimed at the dozen or so satellites that now shepherd much of the world's television, fax, Internet and voice data.").
11. Niall McKay, Did EU Scuttle Echelon Debate?, WIRED NEWS (Oct. 5, 1998) ("According to scores of reports online and in newspapers, Echelon can intercept, record, and translate any electronic communication-telephone, data, cellular, fax, email, telex-sent anywhere in the world."), at http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,15429,00.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals, 56 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 47 (Mar.-Apr. 2000) ("According to much of the press coverage, Echelon is the code word for the UKUSA 'global surveillance network.' But it is not, nor is there any code word for the overall U.S. or UKUSA SIGINT . . . apparatus."), at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ ma00richelson.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
signals.
12 Even if ECHELON was once the code name for one aspect of the United States's COMINT effort, this code word likely has been abandoned as the intelligence community generally changes code words when they are compromised. 13 Since it is impossible from the available information to delineate the precise boundaries of ECHELON, the term will be used generically to refer to the American communications intelligence effort.
The ECHELON program is coordinated by the National Security Agency, the lead signals intelligence agency in the United States.
14 Although the United States plays the lead role in administering ECHELON, the program is a global effort that fully integrates the NSA's counterparts in the United Kingdom (Government Communications Headquarters-GCHQ), Canada (Canadian Communications Security Establishment-CSE), Australia (Defense Signals Directorate-DSD), and New Zealand (Government Communications Security Bureau-GCSB). 15 The 20 These relationships have been solidified with detailed bilateral agreements between the parties. 21 It is believed that the result of these agreements is that the five nations cooperate very closely in all aspects of the collection and processing of signals and share the final product. Working closely with its allies allows the United States to achieve global coverage and also to defer some of the costs associated with this undertaking.
22
This worldwide network of COMINT programs is believed to intercept all forms of global communication, including land-line and cellular telephone calls, satellite communications, electronic mail, facsimiles, and various forms of radio transmission. Historically, the traditional COMINT targets have been military and diplomatic communications, 23 media as commercial and private communications. 24 During the Cold War, this system focused primarily upon the Soviet Union and its allies. 25 In the wake of the Cold War, the COMINT establishment has necessarily shifted its focus to transnational threats such as narcotics trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and organized crime.
26
Ever since electronic communication systems first came into general use in the mid-1800s, the United States has been using electronic surveillance to collect intelligence information. 27 Interception of communications has not always been a high priority for the United States. In fact, in 29 Effective intelligence has proven to be invaluable to the protection of United States national security interests, and SIGINT is especially valuable to policymakers, because its authenticity is more easily determined than other forms of intelligence. According to Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, former deputy director of the CIA and former director of the NSA,
The most traditional COMINT target is diplomatic communications-the communications from each nation's capital to its diplomatic establishments around the world. . . . The United States also targets the communications between different components of a large number of governments. . . . More specifically, the United States intercepts communications between the Soviet Ministry of Defense and Military District headquarters, and between Military District headquarters and units in the field.
Id.
24. Id. (quoting an observer as saying, "With modern communications, 'target' messages travel not simply over individually tappable wires like those that connect the ordinary telephone, but as part of entire message streams, which can contain up to 970 individual message circuits, and have voice, telegram, telex and high speed data bunched together").
25. The large proportion of the discussion of SIGINT that focuses on systems targeted at the Soviet Union is indicative of the importance of this target at the time the book was written in 1989. See id. at 167-97.
26. Tenet Statement, supra note 8 ("SIGINT is critical to monitoring terrorist activities, arms control compliance, narcotics trafficking, and the development of chemical and biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction.").
27 General Carter similarly believes that SIGINT is more useful than photographic intelligence:
Photo interpretation can in some cases be misinterpreted by the reader or intentionally confused by the maker in the first placecamouflage, this sort of thing. SIGINT is the one that is immediate right now. Photo interpretation, yes, to some extent, but you still have to say "Is that really a fake, have they confused it?" 31 For these reasons, SIGINT has slowly supplanted HUMINT as the most important form of intelligence.
B. Collection of Signals
The process of producing COMINT can be broadly divided into two steps: the collection of signals and the processing of those signals. 32 The collection techniques depend on the medium being intercepted. It is alleged that ECHELON intercepts all major modes of signal transmission, including land-lines, high frequency radio, microwave radio relay, communications satellites, subsea cables, and the Internet. 30 . BAMFORD, supra note 1, at 377-78. 31. Id. at 378; see also id. ("Where once America's chief source of raw intelligence was the clandestine agent with his or her Minox camera, today that source is the same worldwide blanket of microwave signals and rivers of satellite transmissions that gives us our telephone calls, our remote banking, telegrams and, soon, our mail.").
32. The collection and processing of signals is the focus of this section of this Note, but they are only two steps in what is referred to as the "intelligence cycle." Prior to collection or processing of signals, there must be a planning phase in which the consumers of intelligence, such as officials of the Departments of Defense and State, identify their intelligence requirements. Once requirements are established, the NSA must then task its assets to collect and process relevant signals. After the signals have been collected and processed, analysts must convert the numerous pieces of raw intelligence into a single, meaningful intelligence report. The finished product is then disseminated to consumers, the final step of the intelligence cycle. For two similar depictions of how the "intelligence cycle" operates, see Microwave radio relay was introduced in the 1950s to provide high-capacity intercity communications for telephony, telegraphy, and later, television. These systems consist of small, low-power transmitters on hilltops that can relay their signals to stations thirty to fifty kilometers away. 37 Only a small portion of the signal is captured by each relay station, which results in the majority of the signal passing over the horizon and out into space. Beginning in 1968, this microwave spillover was exploited with the launch of CANYON, the first American COMINT satellite capable of collecting these errant signals. 38 There are believed to be four of the most recent versions of these satellites, code-named MERCURY, in orbit collecting microwave signals which pass over the horizon and into space.
39
In addition to MERCURY, there are two other classes of COMINT collection satellites currently in use. The ORION-class satellites are believed to be controlled from Pine Gap, Australia, and they target VHF radio, cellular mobile phones, paging signals, and mobile data links. 40 TRUMPET-class satellites intercept the same signals as MERCURY and ORION but are positioned in elliptical nearpolar orbits that allow them to remain over high northern latitudes for extended periods of time. 41 The United States National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Department of Defense (DoD) organization tasked with constructing and maintaining space-based intelligence systems, has announced plans to consolidate these three separate classes of COMINT satellites into what it refers to as an integrated overhead SIGINT architecture.
42
Communication satellites (COMSATS) have become an increasingly common means of communication since their introduction in 1967. The current iterations of COMSATS permit various forms of communication, such as telephone, facsimile, television, and data to be transmitted simultaneously over the same satellite at a rate equivalent to 90,000 simultaneous telephone calls. 43 The data transmitted on these satellites is primarily intercepted by ground-based antennae. The major COMSAT interception facilities are alleged to be located in Morwenstow, England; Yakima, Washington; and Sugar These were believed to be an inherently secure means of communication until a United States submarine, the USS Halibut, successfully "tapped" an undersea Soviet military communication line in October 1971. 46 It is believed that a specially modified 1980s vintage submarine, the USS Parche, continues to conduct cable-tapping operations around the world. 47 Since fiber-optic cables do not "leak" signals, these undersea cables are most likely "tapped" by meddling with the opto-electronic repeaters that are used to boost optical signals transmitted over long distances. 48 Given the wide-ranging activities of the ECHELON program and the fact that an estimated 1.4 billion e-mail messages change hands every day, 49 it is not surprising to learn that there have been allegations that ECHELON also intercepts Internet traffic.
50 Marc Rotenberg, Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, stated that his organization "had reason to believe that the NSA is engaged in the indiscriminate acquisition and interception of domestic communications taking place over the Internet." 51 The Internet would seem to present unique opportunities for the NSA. Because a large portion of the Internet capacity of the world is found in the United States, and because messages are often routed through the 44 When a mail message is sent over the Internet, it is sent as a stream of packets, each containing a portion of the message. Each packet also contains the IP address of the destination. The packets are sent over the Internet using the IP protocol. Specialized networking systems on the Internet, known as routers, examine the IP address in each packet, and route it to the appropriate host. Despite winning a favorable review by an outside group, the F.B.I.'s Carnivore Internet wiretap system continues to raise strong concerns about privacy and the legal limits of government surveillance, a prominent panel of security experts said yesterday. . . . While lauding the Justice Department and [IIT] for a good-faith effort to ex-as CARNIVORE, 57 which is designed to allow that organization to intercept information passing through the Internet, including e-mail, attached documents, and instant messages, has recently become the subject of intense public scrutiny.
Hungarian Radio Calls Echelon System Surveillance by "Big
58 CARNIVORE is a piece of hardware, described as a "small black box," and a piece of software, which are installed at the facility of an Internet service provider (ISP), such as America Online or Earthlink. 59 Once installed, the black box operates in conjunction with the software component to scan Internet traffic passing through the Internet service provider's network. 60 CARNIVORE can be programmed to intercept and collect specific messages that are of interest to the FBI, such as those sent from a particular network or e-mail account. 61 Prior to the use of technology such as CARNIVORE, the FBI must obtain judicial authorization in the form of a warrant identifying the nature of the subject matter to be intercepted. 62 Although there have been no allegations that amine the Internet wiretap system, the computer experts said that that study was designed too narrowly to answer the most pressing questions.
It is reported that in February 2001
the FBI changed the name of this program from CARNIVORE to the less controversial DCS 1000. Carnivore Gets a Name Change, UNIX INSIDER, Feb. 2001 ("The government agency has confirmed it changed the name of the controversial, email sniffing software from Carnivore to DCS1000. . . . The name change is part of the government's attempts to allay fears about the digital monitoring program."). There are reports that the DCS in the new name stands for "digital collection system," although the FBI has not confirmed this. Id. The FBI has stated that the 1000 refers to the first version of the system and that DCS2000 will probably be released in the not-too-distant future. Id.
58. Labaton & Richtel, supra note 49 (reporting on CARNIVORE's capabilities and the surrounding controversy).
59. Id. (describing CARNIVORE as a "system"). 60. Michael J. Sniffen, U.S. Selects Unit of IIT to Analyze FBI's E-mail Surveillance System for Safeguards, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 2000, at 3 (noting that CARNIVORE "has software that scans Internet traffic"). CARNIVORE is essentially a modified "packet sniffer," a diagnostic tool used to monitor networks. Stephen P. Smith et al., Independent Review of the Carnivore System-Draft Report (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore_ draft_1.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The draft provides a surprisingly detailed description of the technology and operation of CARNIVORE. Id.
61. Stephen Labaton, Learning to Live with Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 4, at 3 ("Carnivore could, for instance, be programmed to pick up the e-mail from only one sender and a particular computer, while excluding such e-mail as messages to or from, say, the sender's lawyer or wife.").
62. It is important to note that law enforcement programs, such as CARNIVORE, are subject to greater judicial scrutiny and oversight than foreign intelligence programs, such as ECHELON. See FBI Programs and Initiatives: Carnivore Diagnostic Tool (describing the steps necessary for the FBI to obtain approval to employ CARNIVORE), http://www.fbi.gov/programs/carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). All uses of CARNIVORE require the FBI to seek judicial authorization in the form of a warrant. Id. In contrast, the NSA has discretion to use programs like ECHELON without obtaining judicial authorization as long as the surveillance does not occur within the United States. For a more complete discussion of the legal regime regulating NSA CARNIVORE is in any way connected with the NSA, the technology involved is likely to be similar to some of the tools used by the NSA to intercept Internet-based communications.
C. Processing of Signals
The sheer volume of information that likely is collected through the above techniques is unimaginably large. The vast majority of the information collected is of no interest to the intelligence agencies that collect it and must be systematically discarded. The essence and magnitude of this process was conveyed by former NSA Director William Studeman, who revealed that [o] ne [unmodified] intelligence collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half hour; filters throw away all but 6,500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report is produced. These are routine statistics for a number of intelligence collection and analysis systems which collect technical intelligence.
63
Various automated data-analysis techniques are believed to be used to filter this data before it is seen by a human analyst. The core tool used in the analysis of intercepted communication has been referred to as the "dictionary computer." These dictionary computers, which are located at various collection sites around the world, contain a large database of specified targets, including names, keywords of interest, addresses, and telephone numbers. Incoming messages are evaluated against these criteria in an attempt to have the computer automatically extrapolate interesting pieces of intelligence. 64 The dictionary computers dispersed around the world are allegedly all wired into one network, in a manner similar to a corporate intranet. 65 Each UKUSA member has access to this worldwide network and can indeoperations, see infra notes 114-74 and accompanying text.
63. Vice Admiral William Studeman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Address to the Symposium on National Security and National Competitiveness (Dec. 1, 1992), quoted in Campbell, supra note 2.
64. Campbell, supra note 2 ("Incoming messages are compared to these criteria; if a match is found, the raw intelligence is forwarded automatically.").
65. As one commentator recently noted: Before Echelon appeared in the 1970's, the agencies shared intelligence, but they usually processed and analyzed the intercepted communications. As a result, most exchanges involved finished reports rather than raw intercepts. Echelon, on the other hand, is an integrated network that allows the agencies to specify which intercepts are of interest and to receive them automatically via computer.
Richelson, supra note 11.
pendently add or modify targets on the various dictionary computers around the world. If the dictionary receives a message that meets the target criteria, it automatically forwards that piece of intelligence electronically to the agency that specifically requested it. 66 UKUSA members are also believed to have the ability to search the various dictionary computers from a remote location to find previous messages of interest. 67 Telephone calls and other aural media are generally analyzed based on call-identifying information such as country of origin. 68 Contrary to popular belief, automated word-spotting software that would allow automated processing of verbal communication is not reported to be currently available. 69 This has not been for lack of effort, as former NSA Director Admiral Bobby Inman admitted, "I have wasted more U.S. taxpayer dollars trying to do that [word spotting in speech] than anything else in my intelligence career."
70 Voice-recognition software, however, which can identify the voice of a targeted speaker, is believed to have been in use since at least 1995.
71
The analysis process described above can be complicated if the intercepted signals have been encrypted. Encryption converts a message into incomprehensible data that can only be read by a recipient with a proper key. 72 Both written and oral communication can be encrypted to disguise content from unauthorized recipients. Generally, encrypted signals that are collected by the NSA must be decrypted before they can be analyzed in a meaningful manner. 73 73. In certain circumstances it is possible for encrypted signals that have not been decrypted to be meaningfully analyzed. Targets can be subjected to traffic analysis that focuses on the parties to a communication and the volume of that communications as opposed to the content of those communications. SINGH, supra note 72, at 318 ("Codebreakers continue to use oldfashioned techniques like traffic analysis; if codebreakers cannot fathom the contents of a message, at least they might be able to find out who is sending it, and to whom it is being sent, which in itself can be telling.") For example, a large increase in the volume of communications ema-the sophistication of the encryption and the resources dedicated to cracking that encryption, the decryption process can be quite timeconsuming, and in some cases even impossible. 74 Encryption has historically been the exclusive tool of governments, but with increasing use of personal computer technology and concerns for personal privacy, a demand for encryption accessible to the general public has recently emerged. 75 The de facto standard for private encryption is a program called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGP offers personalcomputer users access to military-grade encryption that, when set to its highest level of encryption, is believed to be unbreakable by organizations such as the NSA. 76 Programs such as PGP have become increasingly user-friendly and are available on the Internet for free download. Because it threatens its ability to provide timely nating from a Soviet submarine base could be used to infer that there might be some type of accident at the base, or that the base was preparing to launch a new type of submarine.
74. Encryption that uses a randomly generated "one-time pad" is the only type of encryption that can be said to be entirely unbreakable because there are no patterns in the code to assist the code breaker. Weekend Edition-Saturday (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 25, 1999) (interview with Scott Simon, author of The Code Book), http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn ("Now there is one type of code that is unbreakable. It's called a one-time pad, and the onetime pad is a random series of instructions; and if it's truly random, there are no patterns; and if there are no patterns, then there's nothing for the code breaker to latch onto.") (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Of course, encryption methods that are theoretically breakable may be in practice unbreakable; for example, a code that would require 1,000 years of computing power to decrypt is effectively unbreakable. intelligence to its consumers, 77 the spread of sophisticated encryption is of great concern to the NSA. 78 Although it is possible that there are additional capabilities that have not yet been revealed, it is more likely that a number of the NSA's capabilities with respect to COMINT collection and analysis have been exaggerated in the recent discussion of ECHELON. 79 As a government agency with finite resources, it is unlikely that the NSA is able to intercept every form of global communication, as has been alleged. Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archive who has been following the ECHELON issue closely, expressed this view:
I would be very skeptical that the N.S.A. could or even would try to process every bit of data out there. . . . It makes sense to question how information they do gather is used, but the hysterical idea that the N.S.A. really cares about the e-mail conversations of everyday citizens is bottom-line nonsense. What everyone is worried about doesn't really exist. 80 An unnamed "U.S. government official with ties to the intelligence community" similarly dismissed some of the more extravagant rumors:
I wish we had something like that which was that good. I mean, it would make my life so much easier, but it just isn't there. . . . I don't 77. Intelligence has little value unless it can be delivered in a timely manner. For example, on December 6, 1941, U.S. codebreaking groups were able to intercept a fourteen-part message from the Japanese government to its American ambassador in Washington. HUGHES-WILSON, supra note 32, at 84-85. The fourteenth piece of the message, which provided warning of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor, was not decrypted in time to be distributed with the other parts of the message, and consequently the intelligence agencies were unable to provide sufficient warning of the attack. Id. at 85-86 (noting that the fourteenth part of the message indicated Japanese intent to break off negotiations and was interpreted as also indicating that an attack on American forces in Hawaii was likely). Although there were other failures in the dissemination process, which ultimately caused the alarms not to be raised in time, if the fourteenth part had been disseminated earlier with the other parts of the message, the Pearl Harbor attack may have been averted or diminished.
78. Observers have suggested that much of the hype surrounding ECHELON has been fueled by the movie industry. 82 In movies such as Enemy of the State and Mercury Rising, the NSA is portrayed as a lawless organization whose members will go to extreme lengths to advance or protect their personal or professional interests. 83 Movies such as these make the public more susceptible to accepting outrageous claims associated with ECHELON. In fact, a fair number of NSAobservers assert that the agency has done a poor job of keeping pace with the progress of technology. 84 Richelson specifically cites the ex- The unidentified government official urged, Get some of those articles that purport to describe the ability of the Echelon system to do marvellous things, and [think through] the engineering work. . . . Figure out how much processing power it would require, the types of collaboration one would need with people who build telecommunications systems, and the amount of government employees you would need to read all the stuff that gets scooped out. We just haven't got it.
Of course, the diehard ECHELON conspiracy theorists assert that statements such as these are merely part of a disinformation campaign designed to deflect attention from the true capabilities of the ECHELON system. Cryptome Note, at http://cryptome.org/echelon-wily.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
For some months now there has been a series of news reports and congressional testimony dismissing the threat of Echelon coupled with declarations on the NSA's diminished capabilities to cope with technologies of the digital era. The essentials of these reports and testimony are almost identical, as with the report [referring to the Register story citing the unidentified U.S. government official]. Customarily, a charge is made that Echelon is a confabulation of journalism without credible bases, and that NSA could not perform the surveillance feats alleged. Cryptome first heard such dismissive accounts in 1998 . . . . We welcome for publication here reports on what could be seen as a sustained disinformation campaign about Echelon and NSA technological prowess.
82. SINGH, supra note 72, at 309 (describing the portrayal of the NSA in Enemy of the State and Mercury Rising); Richelson, supra note 11 ("It is possible that some of the reporting and oratory concerning Echelon may be as over-the-top as these films, in which NSA officials . . . casually authorize murder, even of small children.").
83. In Enemy of the State (Touchstone Pictures 1998), the NSA successfully plots to assassinate a politician who supports a bill in favor of strong encryption. SINGH, supra note 72, at 309. Mercury Rising (Universal Pictures 1998) is the story of the NSA's attempts to assassinate a nine-year-old autistic savant who inadvertently deciphered a supposedly unbreakable NSA cipher. Id.
84. Congressman Sanford Bishop Jr., a Democrat from Georgia, was quoted in 1999 as saying that although the NSA is facing "tremendous challenges coping with the explosive development of commercial communications and computer technology . . . [the NSA] has not demonstrated much prowess in coping with the challenge." Richelson, supra note 11. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) said that as a result of process and panding use of fiber-optic cables, 85 the increased sophistication of encryption, 86 and the recent explosion in the volume in communications as the three factors that have severely impacted the NSA's ability to collect and analyze communications. 87 The difficulty that recent technological advancement poses to agencies such as the NSA was alluded to by John Millis, Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), when he said in 1998 that "[s]ignals intelligence is in a crisis . . . . In the past four or five years technology has moved from being the friend to being the enemy of SIGINT."
88 All of this leaves the NSA in the awkward position of being accused of being both incompetent and omnipotent. NSA Director Lt. General Michael Hayden explained this difficulty when he griped in an interview, "One criticism is that we're omniscient and reading everybody's e-mail, and the other is that we're going blind and deaf. . . . It can't be both." 85. It is harder to intercept signals transmitted over fiber-optic cable than it is to intercept those transmitted via satellite, microwave, or copper wire. Unlike the other forms of communication, fiber-optic cables do not "leak" signals which can be intercepted. See Campbell supra note 2 ("Optical fibre cables, however, do not leak radio frequency signals and cannot be tapped using inductive loops. NSA and other Comint agencies have spent a great deal of money on research into tapping optical fibres, reportedly with little success.").
86. sations propelled the ECHELON story onto the front pages of the European press. 98 The French government seemed particularly incensed that the United States might be using its national intelligence assets to further economic interests and launched an independent investigation into the ECHELON allegations. 99 In July of 2000, the European Parliament appointed a thirty-six-member committee that will spend a year investigating ECHELON further.
100
This negative attention from Europe, and the allegations concerning the illegal interception of the communications of Americans, caught the attention of the United States. Representative Bob Barr and Representative Porter Goss, Chairman of HPSCI, began to investigate the allegations made in connection with ECHELON and became frustrated with the lack of information provided to them by the NSA and the CIA. As part of these investigations, HPSCI requested documents, including legal memoranda from the office of general counsel, concerning the NSA's operating restrictions on intelligencegathering systems such as ECHELON that may intercept the communications of innocent Americans. In an unusual twist of events, NSA officials refused to disclose these documents to the congressional oversight committee on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. 101 The HPSCI Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 included the "additional views" of Chairman Goss. Goss expressed concern that the committee had been unsuccessful in obtaining, "legal memoranda, opinions rendered, and other docu- As a result of this apparent stonewalling, the House of Representatives added an amendment to the annual intelligence budget authorization bill that required the Director of the CIA, the Director of the NSA, and the Attorney General to provide a detailed explanation of the legal standards employed in monitoring the communications of American citizens. 103 The House amendment also required the agencies to provide the oversight committees with copies of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other documents prepared by their offices of general counsel that were relevant to the conduct of signals intelligence. 104 The final version of the amendment that emerged from conference and eventually became law required the presentation of a (a) REPORT-Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in classified and unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance.
(b) MATTERS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED-The report shall specifically include a statement of each of the following legal standards:
(1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such interception may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or from United States persons.
(2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or from United States persons.
(3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States sources of information pertaining to communications to or from United States persons.
(4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the interception of the communications to or from United States persons.
Id.
104. The documents specifically requested were: (c) INCLUSION OF LEGAL MEMORANDA AND OPINIONS-The report under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of the National Security Agency, by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice, in preparation of the report.
written report to the committee but dropped the requirement that the various legal documents used in the preparation of that document also be turned over to the committee. 105 The document prepared by the CIA, the NSA, and tirely, as it sometimes does with especially sensitive issues, and allowed the twenty-day period in which it is statutorily required to respond to expire. 109 As permitted by FOIA, EPIC has continued to pursue the matter by filing a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an attempt to compel the disclosure of the material.
110 EPIC has specifically requested "all 'legal memoranda, opinions rendered, and other documents in the General Counsel's Office' sought by the Select Committee and addressing the question of whether 'NSA was carrying out its signals intelligence mission in consonance with the law, relevant executive orders, guidelines, and policy directives. '" 111 In the fall of 2000, the NSA released over 100 documents to EPIC concerning the NSA's interpretation of the legal restraints on SIGINT activities. 112 In response to this action, EPIC voluntarily dismissed its suit.
II. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
The successful collection of intelligence often requires violations of the law. 114 COMINT collection, in particular, frequently involves violating the target's privacy and trespassing on the systems that transmit information. While it is generally recognized that American intelligence activities must violate foreign laws to be effective, there is a clear distinction drawn between foreign and American laws; the former are frequently bent and broken, while the latter must be upheld at all costs. 115 It is these American laws, which all agree must be carefully followed, that will be surveyed in this part. 115. Id. at 218 ("However, the fact spying on other countries violates their law is far different from the assertion that the activity itself is illegal, as if some skulking shame of criminality The American legal regime regulating COMINT activities is an interconnected series of constitutional provisions, federal statutes, executive orders, and agency guidelines that have been put into place in order to strike a compromise that adequately balances protection of our national interests and the protection of civil liberties.
116 This part will first address the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, the most fundamental right implicated by COMINT collection activities. The evolving judicial attitude towards the relationship between electronic surveillance and the Fourth Amendment will be tracked. This discussion will then turn to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 117 a statutory framework for ensuring that intelligence agencies follow procedures sufficient to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of the subjects of electronic surveillance conducted in the United States for national security purposes. FISA is a complicated statute, but an overview of its operation and salient features will be provided. This part will then turn to Executive Order 12,333, 118 promulgated by President Reagan in 1981. This executive order provides the general framework for the conduct of intelligence activities by agencies of the United States government. Of particular importance for this Note will be the specific provisions of Executive Order 12,333 that deal with electronic surveillance. To insure compliance with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, FISA, and Executive Order 12,333, the agencies involved in SIGINT activities, primarily the Department of Defense (DoD), and the NSA, one of its constituent agencies, have implemented policies to provide their employees with guidance on how to conduct electronic surveillance activities. These will be briefly surveyed in this part. 119 were attached to the enterprise. Our spies are patriots."). It is more than a coincidence that Executive Order 12,333, which provides overall guidelines for the conduct of intelligence-gathering activities, neglects to state that foreign laws should be obeyed in the collection of intelligence. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981) ("All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council.").
116. For additional discussion of this balance between national security and personal liberty, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 119. This Note does not address the separate issue of whether COMINT activities violate any provisions of international law. One observer has asserted that COMINT activities are consistent with international law. Scott, supra note 114, at 217:
The United States is not a party to any treaty or agreement that prohibits surreptitious, nondestructive intelligence collection. Such intelligence collection also does not violate customary international law. In fact, customary international law has evolved [Vol. 50:1467
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution is the most fundamental limitation on SIGINT activities that implicate United States persons. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 120 The Fourth Amendment applies to all searches by the federal government, including those conducted to obtain foreign intelligence. 121 Academics have parsed the Fourth Amendment into the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause.
122 Unlike the Reasonableness Clause, the Warrant Clause does not apply to all searches. 123 Courts have recognized judicially created exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. 124 Examples of these situations include searches incident to arrest, 125 searches of people entering and leaving the country, 126 and searches of closed containers in automobiles that have been lawfully stopped. 127 The executive branch has consistently taken the position that foreign intelligence searches constitute another exception to the warrant requirement. 128 Courts have generally accepted this exception in cases involving electronic surveillance. 129 such that spying has become the long-standing practice of nations. Indeed, while the surreptitious penetration of another nation's territory to collect intelligence in peacetime potentially conflicts with the customary principle of territorial integrity, international law does not specifically prohibit espionage. 131 This was far broader than the national security exception that would be developed later, as it exempted all forms of nontrespassory electronic surveillance from the warrant requirement, not just surveillance to further national security interests. Anticipating the power of electronic surveillance, Justice Brandeis entered a powerful dissent urging that the personal rights of security and privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment were implicated by electronic surveillance and therefore restrictions on such surveillance should be included in the Fourth Amendment.
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In 1967, in Katz v. United States, 133 the Supreme Court reversed its previous position and held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to nontrespassory electronic surveillance. 134 According to the Court, the protections of the Fourth Amendment not only applied to specific places but also to people and their reasonable expectations of privacy. 135 The Katz Court, however, specifically reserved judgment on whether a warrant should be required to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes. This legislation created a statutory framework under which judicial warrants were required for electronic surveillance used for criminal law enforcement purposes. When Title III was enacted, a decade before the passage of FISA, Congress specifically disclaimed any intention to infringe upon the authority of the executive branch to use warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
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The executive branch has historically asserted that it has the inherent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to protect national security. 143 It is claimed that this inherent authority derives from the President's constitutional mandate found in Article II to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 142. Title III of the Omnibus Act specifically stated: Nothing in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power. States."
144 FISA, which represents a compromise between Congress and the executive branch, provides for oversight of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance by all three branches of the government. 145 FISA has been described as "a very complex and difficult statute that reflects a multitude of compromises between the Executive, the Congress, and the various interest groups that influenced its development." 146 The provisions of FISA prescribe the mechanism and the procedural requirements for obtaining permission from the judiciary branch or the Attorney General to conduct electronic surveillance. 147 The electronic surveillance that FISA is intended to regulate is defined to include the interception of international communications to a target who is a United States person in the United States, wiretapping in the United States, interception of the microwave portions of telephone communications in the United States, and microphone, closed-circuit television, or other forms of electronic monitoring of activities in the United States, for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. 150 The proceedings before FISC are nonadversarial, and only the representative from the Department of Justice Office of Intelligence Policy and Review appears before the court. 151 The specific agency seeking to conduct the surveillance, usually the NSA or the FBI, must coordinate with and seek approval from the Attorney General, and it is his representative who presents the application to FISC. 152 For obvious reasons, the target of the intended surveillance is not notified of the proceeding nor represented by counsel. 153 There is also a three-member appellate court that in theory allows the government to appeal a rejection of an application for electronic surveillance by FISC. 154 In practice, the government has little reason to resort to the appellate court: during the period of 1978 through 1999, FISC approved 11,883 applications and denied none. Those less inclined to see government conspiracies respond to this by arguing that the low rejection rate can be attributed to the Department of Justice being aware of the standards FISC will apply and eliminating those applications which do not meet the required guidelines.
The burden of proof that must be met by agencies submitting an application for surveillance to FISC varies depending on the nature of the subject of the surveillance. 156 All applications must certify that there is probable cause that the target of the proposed surveillance is either a foreign power 157 or an agent of a foreign power, 158 as those terms are defined by FISA. For non-"United States persons" 159 it 156 . Legal Standards, supra note 106. 157. FISA defines "foreign power" to mean:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. 159. "United States person" is defined in FISA as "a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for perma-must be shown that the information "to be acquired is merely related to the national defense or security of the United States o[r] the conduct of foreign affairs."
160 When a United States person is the intended subject of the surveillance, a higher standard is imposed, and the application must show that "the acquisition of such information is necessary to national defense or security or the conduct of foreign affairs." 161 The FISA procedures are only to be used in cases involving foreign intelligence information and are completely independent of the procedures adopted by Congress to regulate the use of electronic surveillance in all other criminal matters.
C. Executive Order 12,333
The next significant development in the law governing electronic surveillance in support of intelligence activities was Executive Order 12,333, issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Executive Order 12,333 was designed to clarify the overall framework under which United States intelligence agencies should conduct foreign intelligence activities. Executive Order 12,333 outlines each member of the intelligence community's responsibilities and sets out rules governing the means by which these duties are to be fulfilled. This executive order places responsibility for signals intelligence solely with the NSA.
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It provides:
Collection of . . . information [about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents] is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded." 163 The executive order was intended to provide the framework for an intelligence-gathering apparatus that "achieve [s] In addition to approving the procedures to be implemented by the various agencies, the Attorney General is delegated the power to approve surveillance directed against United States persons abroad. The Attorney General is directed by Executive Order 12,333 to only approve such surveillance if he has determined that there is probable cause to believe that the target is acting as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 166 170 The NSA also has an internal directive, United States Signal Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18, which provides specific operational guidelines to that agency.
171 USSID 18 was previously classified SECRET, and, although a majority of it has been declassified, significant amounts have been redacted. 172 These documents provide instructions on how employees of NSA can collect, process, store, and disseminate the communications of United States citizens while conforming their activities to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, Executive Order 12,333 and FISA. Much of the language in these instructions is similar to that found in Executive Order 12,333, and FISA.
The overall result of the interaction between the Fourth Amendment, FISA, Executive Order 12,333, and the agency guidelines is that the procedures to be followed when conducting electronic surveillance vary depending upon the identity of the target and his geographic location. All electronic surveillance that takes place in the 168 United States must be conducted in accordance with FISA, whose primary requirement is prior judicial authorization from FISC. However, when the surveillance occurs outside of the United States, FISA is not applicable, and there is no requirement of prior judicial authorization. In these cases, Executive Order 12,333 is the primary source of regulation. Executive Order 12,333 specifies different procedures to be followed depending on whether the subject is a United States person or not. If the subject is a United States person, as that term is defined in Executive Order 12,333, then the Attorney General, upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, has the power to authorize the collection. 173 If, however, the surveillance is to occur outside of the United States, and there are no United States persons implicated, then no prior approval from FISC or the Attorney General is necessary. In these situations, Executive Order 12,333 requires only that the surveillance be conducted in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME Though there seems to be a comprehensive set of regulations governing SIGINT activities, these regulations have not been updated sufficiently to account for the technological changes that have fundamentally altered the nature of the SIGINT-gathering business.
175 As alluded to previously, Congress has created different legal regimes to regulate electronic surveillance used in ordinary criminal and foreign intelligence cases. This part will consider three examples of concepts in the regulations that have become obsolete or inappropriate as a result of recent technological innovation. The first concept discussed will be "incidentally acquired information," which allows the intelligence community to retain and distribute information about United States persons who it might otherwise be prohibited from collecting against, provided that the information was collected incidentally to legally authorized collection activities. The increased capability of the SIGINT community to collect and analyze signals creates the possibility that a large amount of intelligence about United States persons will be collected incidentally, thereby threatening to swallow the rule prohibiting collection against United States persons without strictly adhering to certain procedures. The second concept that will be discussed is minimization, which requires that SIGINT collection activities be conducted in the manner least likely to inadvertently collect information about United States persons. If the allegations concerning the volume of signals collected by the intelligence community are accurate, then the concept of minimization has become irrelevant. The third aspect of the legal regime that will be addressed is the requirement that the intelligence community ascertain whether the subject of collection is a United States person. This threshold determination must be made early in the process because it determines what action the intelligence community is permitted to take with respect to the information. The interconnectedness of various forms of communication and the greater anonymity conferred by modern technologies such as the posed legislation that "'would harmonize the legal standards that apply to law enforcement's access to e-mails, telephone calls and cable services.'" Id. (quoting White House Chief of Staff John D. Podesta).
178. The most recent amendments to FISA occurred in late 1998, when it was amended to allow the use of "roving wiretaps," "pen registers," and "trap and trace" devices. Internet make this determination more difficult, if not impossible, to make. These three areas are certainly not the only areas of the law that pose difficulties. However, they serve to highlight the nature of the problem, demonstrating that these laws and regulations need to be reevaluated to insure that they continue to effectively balance the civil liberties of the American people against the national security interests of the United States.
A. Incidentally Acquired Information
The concept of "incidentally obtained information" is one element of the legal regime that may no longer be appropriate in light of recent technological advances. Information incidentally obtained by the United States SIGINT community will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of the problems raised by the use of information incidentally obtained by our foreign partners. Section 2.3(i) of Executive Order 12,333 specifically authorizes the collection, retention, and dissemination of "incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws." 179 The exact language quoted from section 2.3(i) is included as one of the four situations in which the DoD procedures permit the retention of "information about United States persons collected incidentally to authorized collection." 180 This exception was originally designed as a means of ensuring that valuable information accidentally obtained in the course of legally authorized collection need not be disregarded. When viewed from this perspective, the exception seems perfectly logical. However, because the ECHELON system is believed to collect nearly all signals, almost every piece of communication will be "incidentally acquired" by the United States or one of its allies. The modern generation of communication satellites is reportedly capable of simultaneously transmitting 90,000 telephone calls.
181 A large volume of information flowing through the 183 Even if one gives the NSA the benefit of the doubt and assumes that it would not blatantly violate the law by requesting that our allies conduct surveillance on a prohibited target, one can see how the "incidentally acquired" exception could be used for subtle circumvention of the limitations on domestic activities. For instance, in order to curry favor with the NSA, one of its foreign partners might, on its own initiative, undertake surveillance of United States persons in whom it knows that the NSA would have an interest. It could then pass this information along to the NSA, which would be legally permitted to accept it as "incidentally acquired" information. Given the close working relationships between these nations and the nature of the ECHELON system, each country is likely aware of the intelligence targets of interest to other parties.
Other than general allegations, there does not appear to be any specific evidence to support claims of such behavior on the part of the NSA. This is not the case, however, for some of the NSA's ECHELON partners. A former Canadian CSE officer has publicly claimed to have been involved in the execution of such a scheme on behalf of the British government. 184 Mike Frost, the former Canadian spy, alleges that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher requested in February 1983 that two ministers of her government, whom she suspected of disloyalty, be surveilled electronically. It is alleged that, instead of complying with the legal difficulties associated with spying on British citizens, the British GCHQ liaison in Ottawa requested that the CSE conduct the three-week-long surveillance mission on behalf of GCHQ. 185 This anecdote of improper use of information, which could be classified as incidentally obtained, suggests that the entire concept needs to be reevaluated to ensure that what was intended to be a limited exception does not unnecessarily bypass the restrictions placed on the collection of information concerning United States persons.
B. Minimization
The second concept discussed here is minimization. The legal regime surrounding SIGINT activities continually reinforces the position that SIGINT operations should be conducted in the least intrusive manner and that the amount of information collected about United States persons should be minimized. 186 Annex A to USSID 18 specifically provides that, "[c]ollection personnel will monitor the collection of raw data at regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is not avoidably acquiring communications of U.S. persons outside the authorized scope of the surveillance or information concerning U.S. persons not related to the purpose of the surveillance."
188 These were acceptable limita-tions in an era in which targets were carefully chosen. However, in the context of a system that intercepts everything, these rules seem outmoded and meaningless. The concept of minimization is indicative of the general incongruity between the way SIGINT was conducted when the relevant legal rules were implemented and the way it is conducted today. The legislation and regulations that call for minimization seem to be wellsuited to an era in which SIGINT was a narrowly focused activity. The assumption underlying the entire legal regime is that the nature of the intercepted material can be carefully controlled. In the past it seems that specific targets (such as certain geographic locations or specific radio frequencies) were identified for surveillance, thereby limiting the potential for overreaching by the agencies involved.
While the SIGINT agencies still undoubtedly focus their efforts on certain carefully chosen targets, the ECHELON system is believed to be more of a catch-all system: it has been analogized to a vacuum cleaner that ingests nearly every signal on or around the globe. In effect, the vacuum cleaner approach does not discriminate and makes it very difficult to limit what is collected. The availability of automated data processing makes the vacuum cleaner approach feasible today. If ECHELON is a vacuum cleaner, the previous era of SIGINT collection can be likened to a person bending over to pick up specific pieces of debris from the floor. 189 Additionally, these minimization rules were implemented during the Cold War, a time when our enemy was clearly identified. The primary threat to our national security was the Soviet Union, and, therefore, the SIGINT agencies were able to primarily focus their attention on targets associated with that threat. Today, the geopolitical situation in the world has been altered dramatically, and the nature of the threats to United States national security is not as clearly defined. The dragon has been slain, and a multiheaded hydra has emerged in 189. A similar analogy has been presented by Phil Zimmerman, creator of PGP encryption software, who stated:
In the past, if the government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, or listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversations. This is analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. . . .
[T]his kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale. Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail . . . . Unlike paper mail, e-mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing . . . . SINGH, supra note 72, at 296 (quoting Phil Zimmerman).
its place. Today, the United States finds itself threatened by terrorist groups, rogue nations, narcotics smugglers, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These threats have been shown to emanate from a wide variety of groups and geographic areas. Prudence therefore dictates that our SIGINT net be cast wider. SIGINT collectors must not only focus on determining the intentions of the enemy, but now must also attempt to determine who might emerge as the next enemy. The necessity of casting a wider net is difficult to reconcile with the requirements of minimization. Due to technological and geopolitical realities, it is time to reconsider whether the concept of minimization has lost too much of the protective value its creators intended for it to provide to American citizens.
C. United States v. Non-United States Persons
The difficulty experienced in trying to limit the reach of SIGINT activities and minimize their impact on United States persons is a manifestation of the increasing difficulty in determining the identity of the parties to a communication and their country of origin. The legal regime governing SIGINT collection is premised on fundamental distinctions between domestic and foreign activities and between United States persons and foreign persons.
These distinctions have always been problematic. As Frank Raven, the 1960s-era Chief of NSA Group G (collection against Third World countries) stated, [Y] ou cannot divide your problems neatly and cleanly into internal U.S. and external U.S. . . . . You have intelligence which is entirely foreign and you have intelligence which is entirely domestic. But then you have the third category which no one will recognize, which is intelligence which moves back and forth between them.
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USSID 18 includes guidance for operating in this gray area. It provides a set of default rules to guide NSA employees in determining whether to treat a subject as a United States person when the identity of the subject or his geographic location remains unknown. For instance, a person who is known to be in the United States, but whose identity is unknown, will be treated as a United States person unless that person can be positively identified as an alien or the circumstances indicate that he is not a United States person. 191 On the con- Unfortunately, recent technological advances have served to further complicate the process of identifying the nationality and location of the subject of surveillance. In the context of Internet traffic, it would seem to be more difficult than ever to determine whether the parties to a communication are United States persons.
The Internet allows subjects to conceal their identities and communicate anonymously. There are a number of free e-mail services, such as Hotmail, that allow a user to establish an e-mail account without providing any verification of their identity. Further complicating matters is the fact that services like Hotmail allow the owner of the account to receive and send their messages from any computer in the world that has an Internet connection. Therefore, the physical location of the server on which the account actually resides does not provide any insight into the location of the subject.
There are tools currently available that allow the average personal computer user to send and receive e-mail or browse the World Wide Web in an entirely untraceable manner. Anonymous remailers are services that mask the origin of an e-mail address by stripping off all identifying information and replacing it with an anonymous code number. 193 All one has to do is send his e-mail message to a free anonymous remailer, such as the one at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Laboratory for Computer Science, which then strips off the identifying information and resends it anonymously.
194 Anyone trying to trace the e-mail back to the sender would be unable to get beyond the anonymous remailer as these services generally have a policy of destroying the logs of their operations. 195 There are similar Most sophisticated remailers, such as the one at MIT, route messages through a number of different anonymous remailers. Id. Therefore, even if one of the remailers failed to adequately destroy its logs, the sender would still remain anonymous as long as one of the remailers in the chain observed this security practice.
services, such as Anonymizer, 196 that allow for similarly anonymous viewing of Internet web pages. 197 The decentralized nature of the Internet causes difficulty in determining the identity and location of those sending messages. Because messages are often routed through a number of different servers that are frequently located in different countries, it is difficult to work backwards from an intercepted message to determine its source. Philip Reitenger, a senior counsel in the Justice Department's Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Division, complained that trying to trace the path of a criminal communication often requires cooperation with authorities in eight to twenty different nations.
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The locations and nationalities of participants in a communication are threshold determinations that must be made under the present legal regime and have a significant bearing on what courses of action are available to the intelligence agency. The default guidelines on this matter established by the NSA in USSID 18 prove problematic on two fronts. First, they create the potential for the NSA to overstep its bounds by collecting more than it is legally permitted to collect against a United States person traveling abroad, who, at the time he makes his communication, cannot be identified as a United States person. Second, the default rules also threaten to unnecessarily hamper the NSA's effective monitoring of foreign subjects in the United States who are mistakenly assumed to be United States persons. Neither of these results is desirable. Any future revision of the legal regime surrounding COMINT activities must be crafted to account for the unique problems posed by emerging technology such as the Internet.
CONCLUSION
Given all of the above criticism of the current legal regime governing SIGINT activities, one might think that the author is firmly in favor of further restricting the capabilities of American SIGINT organizations. This is not the case. The services provided by these organizations are essential to the national security of this nation. Although the intelligence community, especially the segment involved 196 
